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Carmen M. Reinhart, University of Maryland and NBER
Vincent R. Reinhart, American Enterprise Institute
I. Introduction
A pattern has often been repeated in the modern era of global finance.
Foreign investors turn with interest toward some developing country.
Capital flows in volume into small and shallow local financial markets.
Theexchangeratetendstoappreciate,assetpricestorally,andlocalcom-
modity prices to boom. These favorable asset price movements improve
national fiscal indicators and encourage domestic credit expansion.
These, in turn, exacerbate structural weaknessesin the domestic banking
sector even as those local institutions are courted by global financial in-
stitutions seekingentry into a hotmarket.At thesame time,localauthor-
ities resort to large‐scale foreign exchange sales of the local currency to
cushion the effects on the exchange rate of the capital inflow bonanza.
Other policy interventions, such as increases in reserve requirements
and transactions taxes, usually follow to insulate the domestic economy
from the accumulation of reserves. An inherent tension emerges: Local
authorities take such changes as a global vote of approval that might
encourage them to delay the difficult task of structural adjustment.
This pattern is etched sharply in the experience of the exchange rate
mechanism, the exchange rate mechanism squared, and the Latin con-
vergence associated with the North American Free Trade Agreement
and its regional successors. In the run‐up to a more perfect union, po-
tential entrants are increasingly looked on favorably by global inves-
tors. Those investors appreciate that close integration with a strong
anchor country or group of countries will ultimately discipline policy
makers in the periphery, which will narrow exchange rate fluctuations
and country risk spreads and buoy local equity prices. But these same
dynamics also play out in commodity‐exporting emerging market
economies when the prices of their output surge on world markets or
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978‐0‐226‐10732‐5/2009/2008‐0010$10.00when very low interest rates and sluggish growth in the advanced
countries turn the attention of investors there outward. Across coun-
tries, a different rising tide raises all boats.
But tides also go out when the fancy of global investors shifts and the
“new paradigm” looks shopworn. Flows reverse and asset prices give
back their gains, often forcing a painful adjustment on the economy.
This experience has provided a fertile testing ground for international
economists.AvariedflorahasblossomedthatwillbereviewedinSectionII.
Given double‐entry bookkeeping and the zero‐sum nature of global
trade, these issues of global adjustment have been described in terms
ofthecurrentorfinancialaccountsandasdeteriorationinsomecountries
or improvement in others. Moreover, the time windows have been cho-
sen to isolate the buildup or rundown of any of these measures.
This paper attempts to be encompassing in its examination of these is-
sues by simplifying the definition of the key event that is studied and by
widening the time window around that event. We investigate what hap-
pensbefore,during,andafteracapitalflowbonanza.Thatis,weask,how
doeconomiesperforminandaroundperiodswhencapitalinflowsarerel-
atively large (or, equivalently, when their financial account surpluses are
relatively large)? Owing to data limitations discussed below, we make
this operational by examining episodes of large current account deficits.
We study 181 countries from 1980 to 2007, a subset of 66 countries
from 1960 to 2007 for which more detailed information on economic
variables is available, and a smaller group of 18 countries for which
house price data are available; the samples include all regions and in-
come groups. Our primary aim is to quantitatively define and date capi-
tal inflow bonanza episodes so as to study their various aspects. In
Section III, we document several features of these bonanza periods, in-
cluding their incidence and duration. In Section IV, we examine the evi-
dence on potential links between capital flow bonanzas and debt,
currency, inflation, and banking crises. In Section V, we systematically
illustrate the behavior of a variety of macroeconomic, financial, and pol-
icy indicators on the eve and aftermath of these episodes.
Ourmainfindingscanbesummarizedasfollows:Withnearly50years
of data, it is evident that bonanzas have become morefrequent as restric-
tions on international capital flows have been relaxed worldwide.
Although the approaches differ, this finding is in line with the evidence
presented in Eichengreen and Adalet (2005).
The heavy inflow episode can persist, often lulling policy makers and
investors into treating the bonanza as a permanent phenomenon rather
than a temporary shock. Episodes end, more often than not, with an
Reinhart and Reinhart 10abrupt reversal or “sudden stop” à la Calvo (as in Calvo [1998]). The cur-
rentaccountpatharoundbonanzasisdistinctlyV‐shaped,irrespectiveof
whether the broader, but more recent, sample or the less inclusive, but
longer, sample is the benchmark.
Capital inflow bonanza periods are associated with a higher incidence
ofbanking,currency,andinflationcrisesin allbut thehigh‐incomecoun-
tries (using some of the crises indicators developed in Kaminsky and
Reinhart [1999] and codified in Reinhart and Rogoff [2008b]). This result
is not the artifact of a few extreme cases; in more than 60% of the coun-
tries,theprobabilityofacrisisaroundthedatesofacapitalflowbonanza
ishigherthanfortheentiresample.Capitalflowbonanzassystematically
precede sovereign default episodes.
In developing countries (those designated by the World Bank as mid-
dle and low income), the stance of fiscal policy, as measured by the
growth in real government spending, is notoriously procyclical during
capital inflow bonanzas. This is consistent with the earlier observation
that temporary “good times” are often treated as permanent. In effect,
our preliminary results also suggest that fiscal policy plays a destabiliz-
ing role around capital flow bonanzas—and possibly more generally.
For the advanced economies, the results are not as stark, since there is
nosystematiccross‐countryevidenceover1960–2007thattheprobability
of a financial crisis increases during bouts of heavy capital inflows. The
crisis‐prone Nordic countries in the early 1990s and the Icelandic, U.K.,
and U.S. crises at present would appear to be important departures from
this general result (as in Reinhart and Rogoff [2008a]). Nonetheless, capi-
tal flow bonanzas are associated with more volatile macroeconomic out-
comes for real GDP growth, inflation, and the external accounts.
Real GDP growth tends to be higher in the run‐up to a bonanza and
then systematically lower. The imprint of bonanzas is evident in asset
markets.Equitypricesrisewhencapitalflowsinandretreatwhencapital
flows out. A similar pattern is evident in house prices for our small sam-
ple. A bonanza is not to be confused with a blessing.
The last section (Sec. VI) turns to some of the policy implications of
our analysis and discusses possible future research in this area.
II. Concepts and Data Issues
A. Reviewing the Existing Literature
Theexistingliteraturehasstudiedmultiplemanifestationsofinternational
adjustment in the balance‐of‐payments data. Double‐entry bookkeeping
Capital Flow Bonanzas 11and the global summing to zero of trade flows produce the four alterna-
tive frames of reference laid out in table 1. The main issues of adjustment
can be described in terms of either an improvement or a deterioration
(along the rows of the matrix) in either the current or capital accounts
(along the columns).
There is a rich empirical literature on current account reversals, the
upper‐left cell mostly documenting the macroeconomic consequences
of a marked improvement in a sample of many countries. Many features
ofthesestudiesfollowthepathlaidoutinthepioneeringpaperbyMilesi‐




a single year. Focusing on low‐ and middle‐income countries, they find
that the adjustment experience is heterogeneous and depends impor-
tantly on whether the currency crashes on the foreign exchange market.
Eichengreen and Adalet (2005) extended the sample to include the
pre‐1970 experience, thereby providing historical context. In particular,
large current account reversals appear to be the product of open trade
in goods, services, and assets. Reversals have been frequent only in the
two heydays of global capital markets—the recent period and the 1920s
and 1930s. Large adjustments were much rarer under the pre–World
War I gold standard and during the Bretton Woods years.
An important fuel to the study of current account reversals has been
the U.S. experience of sustained large deficits. The intent is to find rules
of thumb that will be informative about the U.S. experience when the
presumed “day of reckoning” comes and the unsustainable is no longer
sustained. The search for such lessons appears in important papers by
Edwards (2005, 2007) and Freund and Warnock (2005). They find an
important role for the textbook forces thought to rein in a current ac-
count imbalance—a slowing in income growth and a real depreciation
of the currency.
Table 1
Frames of Reference in the Literature
Balance‐of‐Payments Account
Change Current Account Capital Account
Improvement Current account reversal Capital inflow problem
Deterioration Twin deficits Sudden stop
Reinhart and Reinhart 12Similar interest in the U.S. experience produced work in the 1980s on
why the current account deteriorated, which is the subject of the lower‐
left cell of table 1. The main culprit at that time was identified to be the
large budget deficit, which through national income accounting was
mirrored in its twin, the current account. Contemporaneous discussions
of this can be found in Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (1985), and
a later review has been provided by Bosworth (1993). This line of argu-
ment petered out in the late 1990s when the U.S. federal budget went
into surplus but the current account remained deeply in red.
Those researchers focusing on the right cells of the contingency table
typically take the perspective of emerging market economies. In partic-
ular, they view the portfolio investment decisions of investors at the
center of the global financial system as somewhat fickle. Assets in some
emerging markets may be in fashion for a time. Those inflows tend to
appreciate the exchange rate, lead to reserve accumulation as authorities
attempt to offset that force, and push up prices in asset markets. Alto-
gether, this presents a “capital inflow problem” as described by Calvo,
Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), an issue also studied by Fernandez‐
Arias and Montiel (1996).
When capital no longer flows into an emerging market, the nation
can no longer support an excess of spending over income. The result,
in the phrase of Calvo and his coauthors, is a “sudden stop,” forcing cur-
rent account adjustment. The empirical application of this insight can
be found in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2004) and Calvo, Izquierdo,
and Loo‐Kung (2006), both of which are described in more detail in
table 2.
B. Defining a Capital Flow Bonanza
The decision to adopt a particular algorithm to date and catalog capital
inflow bonanzas naturally involves trade‐offs. An advantage of casting
our net wide to all large capital inflow episodes is that it does not pre-
dispose us to episodes that inevitably ended in a marked reversal. In
this sense, there is a lower predisposition to tilt the analysis toward eco-
nomic crises. An inflow bonanza can end with a bang or with a whim-
per. In this sense, our approach parallels the analysis of Goldfajn and
Valdes (1999), who, rather than starting their analysis with currency
crises dates, began by documenting episodes of cumulative real ex-
change rate appreciations of varying degrees and then sorted out which
episodes unwound through an abrupt nominal exchange rate crash
Capital Flow Bonanzas 13Table 2
Current and Capital Account Reversals: Some Definitions
Study Criteria Used to Select the Episodes of Interest
Current account reversals:
Milesi‐Ferretti and Razin (2000);
also Edwards (2005), Eichengreen
and Adalet (2005), and Freund
and Warnock (2005)
Their underlying idea is that “large” events
provide more information on determinants
of reductions in current account deficits than
short‐run fluctuations. These events have
to satisfy three requirements:
1. There must be an average reduction in the
current account deficit of at least 3 (or 5)
percentage points of GDP over a period of
3 years with respect to the 3 years before
the event.
2.Themaximumdeficitafterthereversalmust
be no larger than the minimum deficit in the
3 years preceding the reversal.
3. The average current account deficit must be
reduced by at least one‐third. The first and
second requirements should ensure that we
capture only reductions of sustained current
account deficits rather than sharp but
temporary reversals. The third requirement
is necessary so as to avoid counting as a
reversal a reduction in the current account
deficit from, say, 15% to 12%. Events are




A sudden stop is defined as a phase that meets
the following conditions:
1. It contains at least one observation in
whichtheyear‐on‐yearfallincapitalflowslies
at least two standard deviations below its
samplemean(thisaddressesthe“unexpected”
requirement of a sudden stop).
2. The sudden stop phase ends once the annual
change in capital flows exceeds one standard
deviation below its sample mean. This will
generally introduce persistence, a common
fact of sudden stops.
3. Moreover, for the sake of symmetry, the start
of a sudden stop phase is determined by the
first time the annual change in capital flows
falls one standard deviation below the mean.
(continued)and which did so through reductions in inflation versus their trading
partners.
1
We began with the presumption that the best indicator of capital
flows would be reserve accumulation less the current account balance,
since it measures the resources acquired (or dispersed) through issu-
ance (or retirement) of home country liabilities. This indirect measure-
ment of the change in liabilities seemed more likely to be available for a
longer time span and for more countries than direct information from
financial accounts. In the event, data on reserves tend to be published
only on a delayed basis in many countries. To keep our efforts topical,
the current account balance as a percentage of GDP is our benchmark
indicator. It is measured more consistently across time and international
boundaries than its capital account and financial account counterpart.
2
For the more recent period, the same filter rules are applied to the other
measures as a robustness check as is reported in the appendix.
Table 2
Continued




1. In addition to the criterion of large capital
flow reversals exceeding two standard
deviations from the mean (for their capital
flow proxy), Calvo et al. have the following
requirement:
2. These reversals must be accompanied by a
spike in some external aggregate measure of
the cost of funds in order to capture systemic
effects. More specifically, Calvo et al. use the
(log of the) J. P. Morgan Emerging Market
Bond Index spread over U.S. Treasury bonds
for emerging markets, the Merrill Lynch euro
area Government Index spreads for euro area
countries (as well as Nordic countries such as
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), and G7
Government Index spreads for all remaining
developed countries. Calvo et al. construct
aggregate high‐spread episodes in a fashion
analogous to the Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía
(2004) measure of large capital flow reversals
(i.e., Calvo et al. consider spikes in spreads
exceeding two standard deviations from the
mean) and determine that a sudden stop
occurs when the measure of the fall‐in‐
capital‐flows phase overlaps (on a yearly basis)
w i t ht h ea g g r e g a t eh i g h ‐spread phase. Episodes
thatliewithina6‐monthintervalareconsidered
part of the same sudden stop phase.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 15We began by applying the three‐step approach proposed by Milesi‐
Ferretti and Razin to our data set with a suitable revision that does not
enforce a current account reversal. This approach, however, raised
some issues about dating the bonanzas of many well‐known episodes.
In some countries in which the deterioration in the current account (and
hence the rise in capital inflows) was a relatively smooth process over
several years, this algorithm did not flag these episodes as bonanzas
even though the current account deficits were large by historical stan-
dards. Heavy inflow cases, such as the United States since 2004 and
Australia in several cycles since 1960, were missed altogether. In other
cases, the inflow bonanza persisted after the peak current account def-
icit had been reached. For instance, the Thai and Malaysian current ac-
count deficits peaked in the early 1990s; however, while the deficits
remained large by historical standards well into 1996, these years are
not classified as bonanzas by this algorithm. Many of the important
(but less persistent) surges in capital inflows of the late 1970s and early
1980s also go undetected.
We ultimately settled on an alternative algorithm that provided uni-
form treatment across countries but was flexible enough to allow for sig-
nificant cross‐country variation in the current account. As in Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999), we select a threshold to define bonanzas that is
common across countries (in this case the 20th percentile).
3 This thresh-
old included most of the better‐known episodes in the literature but was
not so inclusive as to label a bonanza more “routine” deteriorations in
the current account. Because the underlying frequency distributions
vary widely across countries, the common threshold produces quite dis-
perse country‐specific cutoffs. For instance, in the case of relatively
closed India, the cutoff to define a bonanza is a current account deficit/
GDPratioinexcessof1.8%,whereasfortrade‐orientedMalaysiathecom-
parable cutoff is a deficit/GDP ratio of 6.6%.
4
Figure 1, which plots the frequency distribution for 181 countries,
highlights these differences across both countries and major income
groups. As the figure makes clear, the range of experience is wide,
but large deficits appear more frequently in lower‐income countries.
C. Sample Coverage and Data
We employ three samples to analyze the capital bonanza phenomenon.
The broadest sample includes the 181 countries covered in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook for 1980–2007. Informa-
tion is available on the current account, real GDP, inflation, and the real
Reinhart and Reinhart 16exchange rate. This allows us to examine the recent country experiences
in a truly global setting.
We will refer to the second data set as the “core” sample, which spans
1960–2007 and covers 64 countries across all regions. This sample is
dominated by high‐ and middle‐income countries, where data avail-
ability poses less of a constraint. It is for this sample that we are able
to examine in greater depth the macroeconomic features of the bonan-
zas. Also, for the core countries, we have a sufficiently complete dating
of economic crises (debt, banking, etc.) that allows us to assess whether
a capital inflow bonanza predisposes countries to financial crises.
The third set is a small sample of 18 industrial countries for which we
have data on house prices from the Bank for International Settlements.
Otherwise, the data coverage for this group is the same as for the core
group. Appendix tables A1 and A2 list the countries (and the income
group they belong to) that make up the three samples.
5
Fig. 1. Distribution of current account cutoffs, used in defining bonanzas: 181 countries,
1980–2008. Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, and authors’
calculations.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 17All data are annual. In addition to including time series on the cur-
rent account, capital and financial accounts, and nominal GDP (all in
U.S. dollars), we employ a variety of macroeconomic time series. These
include country‐specific variables: international reserves, nominal and
real exchange rates, real GDP, consumer prices, export, imports, govern-
ment expenditure, revenue, deficits, equity, and (in the case of some ad-
vanced economies) real estate prices. In addition, we have dichotomous
variables that date external debt crises, currency crashes, and inflation
and banking crises. Global variables, such as commodity prices, interna-
tionalinterestrates,growthintheworld’slargesteconomies,measuresof
macroeconomicvolatility, andthe globalin cidenc eofca pitalflowbona nz as
and various “types” of economic crises, round out the analysis. Appen-
dix table A3 provides a full list of the variables as well as their respective
sources.
The availability of long time series on various aspects of macroeco-
nomic performance was important in deciding on the design principle
of our key indicator—a capital flow bonanza. Because we had gathered
a sufficiently rich data set, we could be somewhat general in defining
events, because we will be able to characterize behavior in a wide win-
dow around those events. That is, we can see the run‐up and the wind‐
down in a manner that encompasses the definitions of earlier work.
III. Capital Flow Bonanzas: Global Cycles and Country Episodes
In what follows, we provide a sketch of country‐specific and global cap-
ital flow cycles, including incidence, by region and income group;
duration; and links to global indicators.
A. The Big Picture
It is relatively well known that international capital flows have an im-
portant cyclical component.
6 The fact that capital (contrary to the pre-
dictions of the neoclassical growth paradigm) does not flow from rich
to poor countries has also received considerable attention.
7 Both of
these stylized facts are illustrated in the two panels of figure 2, which
plot the incidence (i.e., the percentage of countries) of capital inflow bo-
nanzas for the broad sample consisting of 181 countries. The specific
dates of the bonanza episodes on a country‐by‐country basis are listed
in the four‐part appendix table A4, for high, middle‐high, middle‐low,
and low‐income groupings. Column 2 of this table also provides the
dates of sovereign external debt crises (defaults or restructuring).
8 For
Reinhart and Reinhart 18our core sample of 66 countries, which account for about 90% of world
GDP, the bonanza dates for 1960–2007 are listed in table 3.
As the top panel of the figure illustrates, the last major “boom in
booms” was the early 1980s. To be more precise, as the core sample re-
vealsforthelonger1960–2007period,theupswingofthiscyclewasfrom
1975to1982,orjustbeforetheonsetofthedebtcrisisofthe1980s.Priorto
1975, capital flow bonanzas were fewer and further between, consistent
with the historical evidence presented in Eichengreen and Adalet (2005).
Capitalflowbonanzasresurfacedintheearly1990scoincidingwithade-
cline in U.S. interest rates (see Calvo et al. 1993; Chuhan, Claessens, and
Mamingi 1998) and the large‐scale Brady plan restructuring of emerging
Fig. 2. Incidence of bonanzas by region and income group: 181 countries, 1980–2007.
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008), and authors’
calculations.
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Dates of Capital Flow Bonanzas: Core Sample, 1960–2007
Country Years of Bonanzas
High income, OECD:
Australia 1965, 1986, 1989, 2004–5, 2007
Austria 1972–74, 1976–77, 1979–81, 1995–97, 1999
Belgium 1967–68, 1975–84
Canada 1975–79, 1981, 1989–93
Denmark 1969–70, 1974–77, 1979, 1981–82, 1984–87
Finland 1975–76, 1980, 1988–92
France 1966–67, 1969, 1974, 1976, 1982–83, 2005–7
Germany 1980, 1991, 1994–95, 1999–2000
Greece 1983, 1985, 2000, 2006–7
Italy 1974, 1980–82, 1991–92
Korea 1980–83, 1991, 1996
New Zealand 1974–75, 1982, 1984–85, 2005–7
Norway 1974–79, 1986–89, 1998
Portugal 1981–82, 2000–2001, 2005
Spain 1965–66, 1974, 1976, 2000, 2004–7
Sweden 1976–77, 1979–82, 1990–92
United Kingdom 1960–76, 1988–90, 2005–7
United States 2002–7
High income, non‐OECD:
Hong Kong, SAR 1980–81, 1994–97
Singapore 1980–84, 1987
Middle‐high income:
Argentina 1982, 1987, 1994, 1997–99
Brazil 1974–83, 1999, 2001
Chile 1978, 1980–82, 1984–86
Costa Rica 1970–83, 1989–90
Hungary 1986–87, 1993–94, 1998–99, 2003–4
Malaysia 1981–83, 1991, 1994–95
Mauritius 1979–82, 2006–7
Mexico 1974–76, 1979–81, 1991–94




South Africa 1981–82, 2005–7
Turkey 1977, 1980, 2000, 2004–7
Uruguay 1980–84, 2001
Venezuela 1967, 1977–78, 1982, 1987–88, 1992–93, 1998
Middle‐low income:
Algeria 1969, 1973, 1975–79, 1986, 1988–89, 1994–95, 1998
Angola 1982, 1995, 1997–99, 2001
Bolivia 1978–79, 1981, 1985–87, 1993, 1998
China 1979, 1985–86, 1988–89, 1993
Colombia 1971, 1982–83, 1995, 1997–98
Dominican Republic 1966–70, 1972–73, 1975–82, 1987
Ecuador 1978, 1981–82, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1998
Egypt 1967–71, 1974–76, 1979, 1981–85, 1998
(continued)market debt. This resurgence was modest and occurred in a more selec-
tive group of countries—a feature well documented by the World Bank
(1997). With Uruguay in 2002 marking the last major crisis in emerging
markets,bonanzashavereappearedinforce.Theregionalbreakdownin-
dicates that the recipients in this latest wave include countries in Latin
America, mostly smaller ones benefiting from the commodity‐price
boom, industrial countries in which real estate prices had been rising
rapidly, and the nations of central and eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union,presumably beingrewarded forcloserintegration withthe
European Union.
9
Illustrated in the bottom panel of the figure is the well‐publicized em-
pirical regularity that middle‐ and high‐income countries receive the
lion’s share of cross‐border capital flows. This is true by a huge margin
when flows are measured in U.S. dollar terms and remains so when we
calculate the incidence of bonanzas (which scale current account deficits
by GDP). Despite the fact that low‐income countries account for 28%
(50 countries) of the 181 countries in this sample, fewer than 18 countries
have recorded a capital bonanza in any given year during the past
Table 3
Continued
Country Years of Bonanzas
El Salvador 1978, 1989, 1990, 2003, 2005, 2007
Guatemala 1981, 1987, 1992–93, 1994, 1999, 2001
Honduras 1974–75, 1978–81, 1984, 2003–4, 2007
Indonesia 1967–73, 1975,1982–83, 1986–87, 1991, 1995
Morocco 1976–77, 1981, 1983–87
Nicaragua 1988, 1990–94
Paraguay 1980–82, 1986–87, 1996
Peru 1973–77, 1981–83, 1993, 1995, 1998
Philippines 1975–80, 1982–83, 1990, 1993, 1997
Sri Lanka 1979–84, 1986, 1988
Thailand 1975–77, 1981–83, 1990–91, 1995–96
Tunisia 1981–84, 1986, 1993
Low income:
Central African Republic 1980, 1982–84, 1992–95
Côte d’Ivoire 1980, 1988–92
India 1984, 1987–90
Kenya 1980–81, 1987, 1989, 1995
Myanmar 1981–82, 1990–92, 1998
Nigeria 1981–83, 1986, 1993, 2002
Zambia 1981–82, 1998, 2000–2001
Zimbabwe 1981–82, 1992, 2004–5
Note: The dates shown are those picked up by the algorithm described in the preceding
section. Consecutive years (e.g., Greece 2000, 2001) are treated as a single episode.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 2130 years or so. The incidence of capital flow bonanzas is far less cyclical
forthelow‐incomegroup.Onthebasisoftheseobservations,webaseour
more in‐depth analysis of capital flow bonanzas and their link to finan-
cial crises in the next two sections on a group of 66 countries, of which 58
are middle or high income.
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The two panels in figure 3 provide complementary information on
the duration of bonanzas. The upper panel plots the maximum duration
of bonanzas (in years) by countries (rather than episodes). So, for exam-
ple, six of the 181 countries never experienced a capital inflow bonanza
sincetheyarenetcapitalexporters;thisgroupincludesBrunei,Luxembourg,
Namibia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates.
For most countries, bonanzas lasted somewhere between 2 and 4 years,
which is perhaps why so many governments (and investors) fall into the
all‐too‐commontrapoftreatingbonanzasaspermanentratherthantran-
sitoryshocks—anissuewetakeuplaterwhenexaminingthetypicalfiscal
response to the abundance of foreign capital.
We turn now to an analysis of individual episodes. Consistent with
their cyclical nature, three‐quarters of the episodes identified during
1980–2007 last 2 years or less. Some caution is in order in that there
are a large number of instances in which bonanza episodes are sepa-
rated by a single year, which de facto makes the bonanza episode much
longer and adds to the ex ante confusion as to what is permanent and
what is transitory. The present U.S. bonanza, which began in 2002 and
was into its sixth consecutive year by 2007, is by no means common,
but neither is it unique. Australia and the United Kingdom, among
others, experienced similar long‐lived bonanzas in the earlier (1960–79)
period, as table 3 makes plain.
B. The Capital Flow Cycle and World Commodity Prices
Capital inflow surges have often been linked to reductions in interna-
tional interest rates, economic growth in advanced economies, and global
commodity price booms.
11 In the remainder of this section, we briefly re-
visit the well‐trodden path of the external roots of capital flow bonanzas.
Our primary aim in this paper—beyond establishing systematically the
dates and incidence of capital inflow bonanzas—is to focus on the macro-
economic consequences or developments surrounding capital flows (a
topic that takes up the next two sections of the paper). As such, we pro-
vide only a mere sketch of the links between the bonanza cycle and se-
lected developments in global macroeconomic conditions, so as to build
on earlier analyses using the most recent data.
Reinhart and Reinhart 22Fig. 3. Characteristics of bonanzas, 181 countries, 1980–2008. Sources: Authors’ calculations
and data cited in table 3.To this end, we perform two simple exercises. First, we plot our time
series on the incidence of bonanzas for the 181‐country sample over
1980–2007 against (i) real per capita GDP growth in the advanced
economies, as reported in the IMF’s WorldEconomic Outlook(upper panel
of fig. 4); and (ii) the IMF’s index of real commodity prices, excluding
oil (bottom panel of fig. 4).
12 The evidence presented in the top panel
of figure 4 is in line with evidence of Calvo et al. (1993), who posit that
when growth slows in the advanced economies, global capital searches
forhigher yields and profit opportunities abroad in emerging markets—
a phenomenon that is well under way at the current conjuncture, as dis-
cussed in Frankel (2007) in the context of the carry trade and its previous
incarnations. The capital flow bonanza‐commodity price boom link has
Fig. 4. Capital flow bonanzas, advanced economies’ growth performance, and world
commodity prices: 181 countries, 1980–2007. Sources: Authors’ calculations and data
cited in app. table A3.
Reinhart and Reinhart 24an old history, and some classic episodes of well‐managed (in terms of
the macroeconomic policy response) and badly botched varieties make
for interesting reading in Cuddington (1989) and sources cited therein.
While the earlier 1980s do not fit the pattern as neatly, it is important to
note that a spectacular boom in commodity prices prevailed in the late
1970s when the surge in the incidence of bonanzas began in earnest, as
shown in the next section. Beyond the direct positive implications of
higher commodity prices for export revenues for much of the emerg-
ing world, as Frankel (2006, 2008a, 2008b) demonstrates, an underlying
impetus to world commodity prices is low or negative world inter-
est rates, much along the lines of the late 1970s and the last few years.
Hence, the effects of lower international interest rates work through
not only the portfolio channels stressed in Calvo et al. (1993) but also
the commodity price channel à la Frankel (2006). A third and important
link between world realinterest rates and capital flows to emerging mar-
kets comes from the channel stressed by Dooley, Fernandez‐Arias, and
Kletzer (1996), who emphasize the benign impacts of low real rates on
default probabilities.
Our second empirical exercise is an attempt to explain the share of
bonanzas in terms of the growth of real GDP in the advanced econo-
mies, real commodity prices, and the U.S. real short‐term interest rate.
We employ the core data set to capture the significant swing in real
commodity prices as well as the long stretch of negative real interest
rates in the United States in the 1970s. Our dependent variable is con-
tained in a limited range, from zero to 100% as befits a share of a total.
Accordingly, we specify that our independent variables explain the de-
pendent variable by way of a logistic function. That is, the explanatory
variables, along with a vector of ones to capture a constant term, are
aligned in the vector xt with corresponding coefficients in the vector
β to obey the functional form 100   expðxtβÞ=½1 þ expðxtβÞ .
The coefficients reported in the first column of table 4 were estimated
with a maximum likelihood procedure using annual data from 1967 to
2006. As this is a probability forecasting model, the goodness‐of‐fit
measure we rely on chiefly is the quadratic probability score (QPS),
for the reasons explained in Diebold and Rudebusch (1989).
As anticipated in the figures, the coefficient on commodity prices is
positive and that on growth is negative; both are statistically significant
at the 1% confidence level. The coefficient on the contemporaneous real
interest rate, however, does not match the intuition provided in Calvo
et al. (1993). Their explanation relies on the cumulative encouragement
Capital Flow Bonanzas 25to capital flows to the periphery afforded by low interest rates at the
core. To match this, the next six columns of the table report estimates
using successive individual lags of the real rate, from 1 to 6 years. In the
event, the size of the negative effect of real rates on the share and the sig-
nificance of that effect, as well as the explanatory power of the model,
tends to increase as the lag lengthens.
IV. Do Capital Flow Bonanzas Make Countries More Crisis Prone?
Arecapital flow bonanzas a blessing, a curse, or neutral in making finan-
cial crises morelikely or moresevere? The literature is filled with famous
Table 4
Logistic Models Explaining the Probability of a Capital Flow Bonanza Estimated
with Annual Data from 1967 to 2006




Constant −2.345 −2.775 −2.121 −1.855 −1.884 −1.872 −1.727 −1.800



















−.226 −.137 −.142 −.130 −.140 −.137 −.115
(−3.731) (−2.162) (−2.370) (−2.106) (−2.227) (−2.324) (−2.135)
Commodity
prices
.076 .049 .042 .042 .043 .039 .041
(4.912) (3.278) (2.920) (2.735) (2.827) (2.867) (3.669)
Log
likelihood
function −135.3 −145.2 −148.9 −146.1 −147.4 −147.4 −144.8 −140.0
R 2 .471 .440 .323 .415 .372 .373 .450 .568
QPS 3.060 3.973 4.727 5.619 5.016 4.936 5.149 5.250
Sources: Authors’ calculations and data cited in app. table A3.
Note: t‐statistics are in parentheses.
Reinhart and Reinhart 26casestudiesofcapitalflowbonanzasthatendedinspectacularcrises.The
papersrangefromtheinfamousepisodesintheSouthernConeinthelate
1970s to early 1980s (see, e.g., Diaz‐Alejandro’s [1985] classic) to Calvo
and Talvi (2005), which places great store in the capital flow sudden stop
following the Russian 1998 crisis in explaining Argentina’s subsequent
crash. Ratherthan focusing on specific episodes that are either as famous
or more obscure, we systematically examine the potential links between
the likelihood of a capital inflow bonanza and financial crises. Our anal-
ysis isconductedon acountry‐by‐countrybasisaswell asatthe “global”
level consistent with the aim of providing an encompassing approach.
Ourcomprehensivedatabaseonthedatesofbonanzaandcrisesepisodes
allows us to uncover novel results on the systematic connection between
the incidence of bonanzas and debt, currency, inflation, and banking
crises. Hence, our analysis sheds light on the first part of the question
of whether financial crises are more likely; it remains for future research
to investigate issues glimpsed here pertaining to a possible link between
the order of magnitude of the bonanza and the severity of the crises. The
latter part of the section is devoted to more general macroeconomic vol-
atility (as opposed to crises).
A. Bonanzas and Financial Crises: Preamble and Evidence
Section II delineated the criteria used to define a capital flow bonanza
and catalogued, country by country, all the identified bonanza episodes.
To examine the potential links with financial crises of various stripes, we
proceedsymmetrically.OurcrisisanalysisistakendirectlyfromReinhart
and Rogoff (2008b). These crises definitions are reproduced in table 5,
and a full listing of dates for sovereign external defaults (or restructur-
ings), currency crashes, inflation crises, and banking crises are presented
intable6for64ofthe66corecountriesforwhichwehavedatesoncapital
flow bonanzas.
13 In line with our dating of bonanzas, table 6 provides
beginningandendingdatestodefineeachcrisisepisode.Hence,anentry
of a single year denotes that the crises lasted only that long.
From the crises dates shown in table 6 and the bonanza dates listed in
table3,weconstructedafamilyofcountry‐specificprobabilities.Foreach
of the countries, this implies four unconditional crisis probabilities: that
of default (or restructuring) on external sovereign debt, a currency crash,
an inflation crisis, and a banking crisis. We also construct the probability
of each type of crisis within a window of 3 years before and after the
bonanza year or years; we refer to this as the conditional probability of
a crisis. If capital flow bonanzas make countries more crisis prone, the
Capital Flow Bonanzas 27Table 5
Defining Crises by Events: A Summary
Type of Crisis Definition and/or Criteria Comments
Banking crisis We mark a banking crisis by
two types of events: (1) bank
runs that lead to the closure,
merging, or takeover by the
public sector of one or more
financial institutions; and
(2) if there are no runs, the
closure, merging, takeover,
or large‐scale government
assistance of an important
financial institution (or
group of institutions) that
marks the start of a string of
similar outcomes for other
financial institutions.
This approach to dating the
beginning of the banking
crises is not without
drawbacks. It could date the
crises too late, because the
financial problems usually
begin well before a bank is
finally closed or merged; it
could also date the crises too
early, because the worst of a
crisis may come later. Unlike
external debt crises (see
below), which have
well‐defined closure dates,
it is often difficult or
impossible to accurately
pinpoint the year in which
the crisis ended.
External debt crises A sovereign default is defined
as the failure to meet a
principal or interest
payment on the due date (or
within the specified grace
period). The episodes also
include instances in which
rescheduled debt is
ultimately extinguished in
terms less favorable than the
original obligation.
While the time of default is
accurately classified as a
crisis year, there are a large
number of cases in which
the final resolution with the
creditors (if it ever did take
place) seems interminable.
For this reason we also work
with a crisis dummy that
picks up only the first year.
Inflation crisis An annual inflation rate of
20% or higher. We also
examine separately the
i n c i d e n c eo fm o r ee x t r e m e
cases in which inflation
exceeds 40% per year.
All consecutive years in which
the threshold is met or
exceeded are counted as
a part of the same inflation
crisis.
Currency crash An annual depreciation vs. the
U.S. dollar (or the relevant
anchor currency—historically
the U.K. pound, the French
franc, or the German deutsche
mark and presently the euro)
of 15% or more. This is
similar to the Frankel and
Rose (1996) approach to
dating crashes.
In parallel treatment to the
inflation crisis dating,
all consecutive years in
which the threshold is met
or exceeded are counted as a
part of the same inflation
crisis.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b).
28Table 6
Dates of Economic Crises: Core Sample, 1960–2007




















Finland 1967, 1992 1991–94




















New Zealand 1976, 1980–82,
1987, 1989
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El Salvador 1973, 1988 1985–87, 1990,
1993
1989
Guatemala 1986, 1989 1986, 1989–90 1986, 1990–91
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Kenya 1994–98, 2000 1984, 1992–94 1985–89,
1992–95
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31conditional probability, PðCrisisijBonanzaÞ, should be greater than the
unconditional probability of a crisis, PðCrisisiÞ, where the subscript i re-
fers to the ith “type” of crisis (default, currency, etc.).
Table 7 aggregates these country‐specific conditional and uncondi-
tional probabilities by three groups (all countries, high‐income, and
middle‐ and low‐income). The test statistic for the equality between
two proportions,
Z ¼
p1   p2
fPð1   PÞ½ð1=n1Þþð 1=n2Þ g
1=2 ;
where P ¼ð p1n1 þ p2n2Þ=ðn1 þ n2Þ, is calculated for each pair of prob-
abilities, where n1 ¼ n2 is the number of observations in each group.
The instances in table 7 in which the difference in proportions is signifi-
cantly different at the 1% confidence level are marked with an asterisk.
The main results are summarized as follows. For the full sample, the
probability of any of the four varieties of crises conditional on a capital
flow bonanza is significantly higher than the unconditional probability.
Put differently, the incidence of a financial crisis is higher around a cap-
ital inflow bonanza. However, separating the high‐income countries
from the rest qualifies the general result. As for the high‐income group,




































Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) and sources cited therein.
Note: These include all crises (by type) around the bonanzas. Crisis definitions are
presented in table 5.
aA near default episode.
Reinhart and Reinhart 32These results are not entirely surprising since the high‐income coun-
tries do not default on their sovereign debts during the sample in ques-
tion.
14 Given that the threshold that defines an inflation crisis is 20% per
year, it is also hardly a surprise that this cutoff is seldom surpassed by
wealthy countries—whether experiencing a capital flow bonanza or
not. It is less obvious, a priori, that there is no discernible increase in
the likelihood of a banking or currency crisis for the advanced econo-
mies. The bottom row of table 7 provides the share of countries for
which PðCrisisijBonanzaÞ≥PðCrisisiÞ as an additional indication of
how commonplace it is across countries to see bonanzas associated
with a more crisis‐prone environment. For sovereign defaults, less than
half the countries record an increase in default probabilities around cap-
ital flow bonanzas. (Here, it is important to recall that about one‐third
of the countries in the core sample are high income.) For currency, bank-
ing, and inflation crises, the majority of countries register a higher pro-
pensity to enter into a crisis around bonanza periods.
Beyond the aggregate results presented in table 7, figures 5–8f o r
debt, currency, inflation, and banking crises, respectively, present a
Table 7
Are Bonanza Episodes More Crisis Prone? Core Sample, 1960–2007










Conditional on a bonanza (3‐year window) .2 9.5 2.6 11.9
Unconditional .0 8.2 2.1 11.2
Difference .2 1.3 .5 .7
Middle and Low Income
Conditional on a bonanza (3‐year window) 29.6 31.5 31.7 20.7







Conditional on a bonanza (3‐year window) 22.2 25.8 24.2 18.4






Percentage of countries for which conditional
probability is greater than unconditional 42.2 65.6 59.4 60.9
Sources: Based on tables 2 and 4 and authors’ calculations.
Note: The 3‐year window encompasses 3 years before the bonanza years listed in table 2,
the year (or years if these are consecutive) of the bonanza, and the 3 years following the
episode.
*Significant at the 1% confidence level.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 33Fig. 5. Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Sovereign external default, 66 countries,
1960–2007. Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), and sources cited
therein.
Fig. 6. Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Currency crashes, 66 countries,
1960–2007. Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), and sources cited
therein.
34Fig. 7. Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Inflation crises, 66 countries, 1960–2007.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), and sources cited therein.
Fig. 8. Are bonanza episodes more crisis prone? Banking crises, 66 countries, 1960–2007.
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), and sources cited therein.
35comparison of conditional and unconditional probabilities for individ-
ual countries, where the differences in crisis probabilities were great-
est. (Hence, the country list varies across figures.) As noted earlier, no
high‐income country turns up in figure 5 on debt crises. The same can-
not be said of figures 6–8. While the advanced economies register much
lower (conditional and unconditional) crisis probabilities than their
lower‐income counterparts, the likelihood of a crisis is higher around
bonanza episodes in several instances. Notably, Finland and Norway
record a higher probability of a banking crisis during the vicinity of a
capital flow bonanza, whereas Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom
show a greater predisposition to an inflation crisis when bonanzas are
present.
B. Bonanzas as a Predictor of Sovereign Defaults
Beyond the country‐by‐country comparisons described in the preceding
section, we wanted to refine further the relationship between bonanzas
and sovereign defaults. As discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) in
the context of the evidence from 1800–2007, there is an intimate connec-
tion between the global capital flows (as measured annually in terms of
U.S. dollars) and default (exactly as measured here, by the incidence of
sovereign default). Avariant of this relationship is presented in figure 9,
Fig. 9. Capital flow bonanzas as predictors of sovereign default, 66 countries,
1960–2007. Sources: Authors’ calculations, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), and sources
cited therein.
Reinhart and Reinhart 36which plots the annual incidence of capital flow bonanzas during 1960–
2007 for the core sample and the comparable incidence on sovereign
default. The overall incidence is higher and more variable than that
shown in figure 1 for the 181 countries, since the core sample predomi-
nantly represents countries that have access to international capital
markets and, in particular, private flows. A cursory inspection of this
figure is suggestive that the incidence of bonanzas possibly “leads”
the incidence of default. This temporal pattern would seem plausible
in light of the fact that capital inflows to developing countries have his-
torically been predominantly debt‐creating flows.
15 As the bonanza
continues, leverage (usually public and private) increases.
16
To investigate this possibility formally, we ran a series of logistic re-
gressions in which the dependent variable is the aggregate or global
probability of sovereign default against the aggregate or global proba-
bility of a capital flow bonanza, either contemporaneous or lagged any-
where between 1 year and 6 years. As in the prior section, this functional
form respects the limited range of the dependent variable. These results
aresummarizedintable8alongthecolumnheadingsforlagsupto6years.
As the results indicate, the fit of regression improves steadily as the lag
length is extended up to 6 years. The single bonanza regressor is statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level for the regressions, where the t‐statistics
appear in parentheses. The preferred specification (six lags) yields an R2
of about 0.50. Similarly, the QPS statistic falls. As in the previous discus-
sion on determinants, the global factors behind bonanzas, this exercise is
meant to be illustrative rather than a self‐contained model of sovereign
default. It is worth mentioning that this external default time series reg-
isters a contemporaneous correlation with world real interest rates of
0.59, underscoring that there are multiple factors beyond bonanzas that
determine the likelihood of a sovereign debt crisis. These results would
notbeunfamiliartothereaderofMendozaandTerrones(2008),whocon-
clude that not all credit booms end in financial crises, but most emerging
markets crises were associated with credit booms.
C. Bonanzas and Macroeconomic Volatility
Crises, like bonanzas, are discrete, traumatic, and (in the more stable
countries) relatively rare. Yet another possibility in which capital flow
bonanzas would be less than a blessing might be if these bouts of capi-
tal inflows led to an overall increase in macroeconomic volatility,
even if it did not increase the odds of a financial crisis outright. To shed
some light on this issue, we performed some simple exercises involving
Capital Flow Bonanzas 37the volatilities of real GDP growth, consumer price inflation, and the
current account/GDP ratio. Needless to say, this only skims the surface
of the potential links between bonanzas and macroeconomic volatility.
We measure volatility as the 66th percentile of the absolute annual
change in each macroeconomic variable. Table 9 reports for the full sam-
ple the simple pairwise correlations between the incidence of capital
Table 8
Logistic Models Explaining the Probability of Default: Estimated with Annual Data
from 1967 to 2006
Share of Countries with Capital Flow Bonanzas
Lagged
Constant
Term Current 1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant −1.637 −1.526 −1.778 −1.989 −2.093 −2.211 −2.323 −2.345

















function −148.1 −147.9 −147.8 −146.2 −144.3 −141.4 −137.4 −135.3
R 2 .000 .008 .014 .091 .173 .284 .413 .471
QPS 1.921 1.906 1.895 1.747 1.589 1.375 1.129 1.018
Sources: Authors’ calculations and data cited in app. table A3.
Note: t‐statistics are in parentheses.
Table 9
Incidence of Bonanzas and Volatility: 181 Countries, 1980–2007
Volatility Correlation
Real GDP growth .43
Inflation .25
Current account to GDP .39
Sources: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook and authors’ calculations.
Note: We measure volatility as the 66th percentile of the absolute annual change in each
macroeconomic variable.
Reinhart and Reinhart 38inflow bonanzas from 1981 to 2007 and the volatility (as described
above) of real GDP growth, inflation, and the current account to GDP.
For all three variables the correlation is positive (ranging from a low of
0.25 for inflation to a high of 0.43 for real GDP growth) and statistically
significant. Of course, this exercise does not speak of causality or how
representativethis“global”bonanza‐volatilitylinkplaysoutforindivid-
ual countries.
V. Anatomy of Bonanza Episodes
The macroeconomic developments associated with surges in capital
inflows are a mixture of anecdotal evidence from case studies and
more systematic analyses that (to our knowledge) have no standard-
ized definition of “a capital inflow episode” or bonanza.
17 The collec-
tive evidence from this literature suggests that capital inflows are
m o s to f t e na s s o c i a t e dw i t hb o t had e t e r i o r a t i o ni nt h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n t
a n da na c c u m u l a t i o ni ni n t e r n a t i o n a lr e s e r v e s ,o s t e n s i b l yf r o mt h e
central bank’s persistent efforts to avoid or mitigate the tendency to-
ward a nominal and real exchange rate appreciation that usually goes
hand‐in‐hand with the capital inflow.
18 As Calvo et al. (1993) docu-
m e n ti ns e v e r a lp a p e r s ,t h ep r e s s u r e sf o rt h ee x c h a n g er a t et oa p p r e c i -
ate stem both from an increased demand for the local assets (which
may or may not lead to an asset price boom or bubble) and from an
increase in aggregate demand for both traded and nontraded goods.
As long as the supply of the nontraded good is not perfectly elastic,
t h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo fn o n t r a d a b l e si n c r e a s e s( i . e . ,ar e a le x c h a n g er a t e
appreciation).
In an attempt to analyze the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in ad-
vanced and emerging market economies, Kaminsky, Reinhart, and
Végh (2004) present evidence for emerging markets of the “when it
rains, it pours” phenomenon; that is to say, that the cyclical components
of GDP, net capital flows, and real fiscal spending all reinforce each
other. Periods of cyclically high capital inflows are associated with an
expansion in real government spending: fiscal policy is procyclical in
relation to both output and capital inflows.
Some of these macroeconomic trends, notably the worsening current
account, appreciating real exchange rates, and rising asset prices, regularly
present themselves on the eve of currency and banking crises (Kaminsky
and Reinhart 1999) and sudden stops (Edwards 2004, 2007). In the re-
mainder of this section, we extend such comparisons.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 39A. Growth, Inflation, and the Current Account
Capital flow bonanzas—as with sudden stops, current account rever-
sals, and financial crises—each have their own idiosyncrasies. How-
ever, these episodes also tend to share common threads that cut
across time and national boundaries, which we exploit by opening a
wide window of comparison.
Our strategy is to examine the behavior of key macroeconomic and
financialindicatorsintherun‐upandaftermathoftheidentifiedbonanza
episodes, starting with the “big picture.” Figure 10 presents four panels
showingmediansacrossepisodesduring1980–2007forkeymacroeconomic
Fig. 10. Growth, inflation, the current account, and real exchange rate around bonanzas,
181 countries, 1980–2007. Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook
(April 2008), and authors’ calculations.
Reinhart and Reinhart 40indicators:realGDP growth, inflation,the current account balance/GDP
ratio, and the real exchange rate. We plot each series from 4 years (−4)
before the bonanza (year 0) to 4 years (4) after. Because of the enormous
diversity in our 181‐country sample, the medians are plotted separately
for high‐, middle‐, and low‐income countries (denoted by solid, dashed,
and dotted lines, respectively). In line with the findings of several papers
on capital account reversals and sudden stops, the average path of the
current account balance to GDP (top‐right panel) is distinctly V‐shaped,
withthecurrentaccountdeterioratingintothebonanzayearandimprov-
ing steadily thereafter. Note that this is not an artifact of our selection cri-
teria. We do not select for big changes, only big levels. Current account
deficitsare,onaverage,largestforthelow‐incomecountriesandsmallest
for the advanced economies, consistent with the evidence reported ear-
lier on cutoff values. The path of the real exchange rate (bottom‐left
panel) shows that there is a cumulative appreciation (a decline denotes
an appreciation) up to the bonanza year and a sharp depreciation after-
ward. The analysis of Goldfajn and Valdes (1999) presents compelling
evidence that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the cumulative real
appreciation unwinds through a swift nominal depreciation (perhaps
through a full‐fledged currency crisis) rather than through a downward
adjustment in prices.
GDP growth rises into the bonanza but then slows, settling back to a
roughly prebonanza growth rate for middle‐ and low‐income countries
and a markedly lower growth rate for high‐income economies. As to
inflation, the trajectory is so diverse across the three income groups that
it is impossible to draw any conclusion as to a fixed behavioral pattern.
This suggests that the efforts of central banks in anchoring expectations
are more important than the stage of the capital‐flow cycle.
This association holds across individual countries as well. Figure 11
provides reinforcing cross‐episode evidence via scatter plots that com-
pare the real GDP growth and inflation performance for the year before
and after the bonanza. Observations above the 45‐degree ray indicate
that growth (inflation) is higher 1 year after the bonanza than the year
before the bonanza episode; the converse is true for observations below
the diagonal. Taken together, these scatter plots confirm that for the
most part (63% of the episodes) growth is lower after the capital inflow
boom, whereas no clear pattern emerges for inflation.
The narrative illustrated in figure 12 for the core 66 countries for the
longer sample spanning 1960–2007 intimately mirrors the broader post‐
1980 experience; the current account registers a V‐shaped pattern, infla-
tion is markedly different for the wealthy and not‐so‐wealthy countries,
Capital Flow Bonanzas 41Fig. 11. Before and after: growth and inflation around bonanzas, 181 countries,
1980–2007. Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008),
and authors’ calculations.and real growth picks up in the run‐up to the bonanza but does worse
in the aftermath—particularly for high‐income countries. Whatever
growth benefits accrue during the bonanza phase are but short lived.
B. External Sector: Reserves, Exchange Rates, and Trade
There is a blossoming recent literature trying to explain why many
emerging market countries have been amassing international reserves
at an unprecedented clip. Some studies have stressed a “precautionary”
motive in which countries build their war chests in good times to pro-
vide liquidity if need be in bad times (see, e.g., Bastourre, Carrera, and
Ibarlucia2008;CarrollandJeanne2008).Whattheupperpaneloffigure13
makes plain is that the practice of accumulating reserves, especially in de-
veloping countries during capital inflow years (which characterizes the
current juncture for many emerging markets), is far from new, since the
episodes depicted in this figure span 1960 to the present. Reluctance to al-
low for a sustained nominal or real exchange rate appreciation is a con-
stant that has withstood the test of time in emerging markets. Tendencies
to lean against the wind are seldom more pronounced than when there
Fig. 12. Growth, inflation, and the current account around bonanzas, 66 countries,
1960–2007. Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008),
International Financial Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 43is a capital inflow bonanza under way. The 40% plus increase in reserves
in the run‐up to the bonanza is no trivial change for the middle‐ and
low‐income countries, which as of 2007 held about twice as much in re-
serves as their high‐income counterparts (bottom panel).
Fig. 13. International reserves around bonanzas, 66 countries, 1960–2007: Sources:
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, and authors’ calculations.
Reinhart and Reinhart 44There is little surprising in figure 14, which displays the same graphs
for the external indicators (trade balance, exports, imports, and real ex-
change rate) for the 66‐country sample. The trade balance follows the
same path of the current account, since imports expand more rapidly
than exports at the outset of the bonanza. The real exchange rate initially
appreciates and subsequently depreciates in the years immediately fol-
lowingthecapitalflowbonanza.Theonlyincrementalevidencerevealed
by figure 14 is that the real depreciation shown in the bottom‐right panel
is noticeably smoother than that shown in figure 9 for the 181‐country
average after 1980; possibly this difference may reflect that crises are
more severe (Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999) and reversals more acute
(EichengreenandAdalet2005)inthemorerecentperiodorthattheaddi-
tion of lower‐income countries in the larger sample adds to volatility.
C. Fiscal Policy: Amplifier or Stabilizer
Managing surges in capital inflows poses nontrivial policy challenges, par-
ticularly if the inflows are persistent and/or if the orders of magnitude
Fig. 14. Externalindicators andbonanzas,66 countries,1960–2007. Sources: International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008), International Financial Statistics, and
authors’ calculations.
Capital Flow Bonanzas 45are staggering; these policy challenges are discussed in detail and ex-
amples provided in Reinhart and Reinhart (1998). Policy responses can
mitigate the downside of capital flow bonanzas (recall that the main
conclusion from the preceding section is that bonanzas are historically
associated with higher odds of a financial crisis) or amplify their more
worrisome tendencies. The mismanagement of capital flow bonanza/
commodity price boom episodes (see Cuddington 1989) more often
than not has its roots in the authorities’ premise that the “good times”
are permanentand,assuch,canfullysupportafull‐fledgedexpansionin
real fiscal spending. This is the essence of fiscal procyclicality as docu-
mented by Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky et al. (2004).
Figure 15 presents, in a comparable format, the evolution of real gov-
ernment spending and revenues and the fiscal balance (all indexed to
the level 4 years prior to the bonanza). The deeply entrenched pattern of
procyclicalfiscalbehaviorbymiddle‐andlow‐incomecountriesemerges
unambiguouslyfromthethreepanelsthatmakeupthefigure.Government
spending from 2 years prior to the year of the bonanza rises by about 20%
in real terms at a time during which growth is accelerating, as discussed.
Despite even fastergrowth in government revenues (than in expenditures),
Fig. 15. Fiscal indicators and bonanzas, 66 countries, 1960–2007. Sources: International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008), International Financial Statistics,
Government Financial Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
Reinhart and Reinhart 46the fiscal balance deteriorates markedlyintothe bonanza year. (This dete-
riorationmaterializesbecause,whilerevenuesaregrowingmorerapidly,
theyaredoingsofromalowerbasethanexpenditures4yearspriortothe
bonanza.) Thelaxexpenditureduringthe boomphase (andthe associated
deteriorationinthefiscalbalance)setsthestagefora“nonvoluntary”fiscal
tightening when the economic downturn sets in. Hence, as Kaminsky et al.
(2004) illustrate, the magnitude of the swing in real fiscal spending during
the cycle from boom to bust can be as large as 25–35 percentage points
(as in the case of Uganda and Liberia, respectively).
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Kaminsky et al. rank the government’s procyclicality propensity by
two measures: the correlation between the cyclical component of real
GDP and real fiscal spending (if positive, it implies procyclicality)
and the amplitude of the swing in real spending (as described). Using
these two indicators, we conducted a simple exercise to shed light on
the plausible conjecture that the procyclical nature of government
spending may help explain why the odds of a financial crisis increase
around capital flow bonanzas, as illustrated in the preceding section.
On a cross‐country basis, we correlated the difference between the con-
ditional, PðCrisisijBonanzaÞ, and unconditional, PðCrisisiÞ, probability
for each of the four types of crises (as shown for selected countries in
figs. 4–8) and the two Kaminsky et al. measures of fiscal procyclicality
(one at a time). The eight correlations were positive, ranging from 0.25
to 0.46; six of the correlations were statistically significant. The results of
these preliminary exercises are, thus, consistent with our conjecture about
the destabilizing role of fiscal policy around capital flow bonanzas—and
possibly more generally.
D. Asset Markets
The last indicators we examine around bonanza periods are asset
prices, specifically, real equity prices for the 66‐country sample and real
h o u s ep r i c e sf o ras u b s e to f1 8h i g h ‐income countries for the period
1970‐2007. There has been discussion and some anecdotal evidence to
suggestthatassetpricesboomduringsomefamouscapitalinflowbonanzas
(as in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi [2003]). Such a phenomenon appears rea-
sonable, since a capital inflow represents an increased demand (by the rest
of the world) for a particular country’s assets, which would include equity
and real estate. As to asset prices and crises, one cannot read Kindleberger
(1989) without drawing a tight link between the two.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) present evidence to suggest that equity
price bubbles are systematically present on the eve of banking crises;
Capital Flow Bonanzas 47indeed, they are a good leading indicator of these. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2008a) present evidence that real house prices boomed on the eve of the
worst post–World War II banking crises in emerging market economies.
Figures 16 and 17 suggest a three‐way link between capital inflow
bonanzas, asset price booms, and financial crises. For both asset mar-
kets (for equities in fig. 16 and houses in fig. 17), there is a marked rise
in inflation‐adjusted prices that peaks at the time of the bonanza and is
followedbya sustaineddecline duringthe 4 yearsfollowing the bonanza.
When the evidence on the higher likelihood of a sovereign default in par-
ticular (and other types of financial crises in general), the slowdown in
real GDP growth, and the protracted decline in asset values following
the capital bonanza are taken together, the swift corrections in the twin
deficits (current account and fiscal) observedafter the bonanza may likely
be a matter of necessity rather than choice.
VI. Conclusion
Conversations revolving around international financial adjustment
sometimes have an aspect similar to the climactic scene in a few Hollywood
crime movies in which the villain lures the hero into a hall of mirrors. It
is not clear which is the originating action and which is the reflection,
so that left can be right, or right left. Invariably, the initial target turns
out to be glass. In international finance, one country’s current account
Fig. 16. Equity prices and bonanzas, 66 countries, 1960–2007. Sources: International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008), International Financial Statistics, and
authors’ calculations.
Reinhart and Reinhart 48Fig. 17. House prices and bonanzas, 18 advanced countries, 1970–2006. Sources:
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (April 2008), International Financial
Statistics, Bank for International Settlements, and authors’ calculations.surplus can correspond to many countries’ deficits, and a surplus is mir-
rored in a deficit in the capital account. As a consequence, the consider-
able literature on international adjustment overlaps to a significant
degree, even though the studies adopt different selection criteria for
what constitutes an event.
We have adopted a back‐to‐basicsapproachtowardunderstandingsome
of the features of episodes of heavy capital inflows that, given double‐entry
bookkeeping, have usually meant periods of large current account deficits
byhistoricalstandards.Byfocusingsquarelyontheperspectiveoftherecip-
ient of capital inflows (wherever or however poor or wealthy that country
may be), our analysis does not extend to issues pertaining to lending coun-
tries or the broader and currently popular discussion of global imbalances.
Nearly all the areas we have touched on, as to both the causes and conse-
quences of the bonanzas, merit further scrutiny, particularly as relating to
the links between asset prices, bubbles, crises, and capital flows.
As to the policy responses to capital inflow bonanzas, our analysis
has been silent in all dimensions but one. Namely, we present evidence
on the infamously procyclical and destabilizing reaction of fiscal policy
(specifically, government spending) to the capital flow bonanza in
nearly all but the high‐income countries.
20 The expansionary fiscal pol-
icy unfolds against a backdrop of higher growth in output and govern-
ment revenues associated with the bonanza. It is not unreasonable to
conjecture that these government spending practices in “good times”
set the stage for a multidecade pattern of serial default.
During the past few years, international interest rates have remained
low(byhistoricalstandards),andrealinterestrateshaveturnednegative
on a sustained basis for the first time since the late 1970s. Commodity
prices have surged. Once again, investors in the financial centers of the
worldandelsewherearetrippingoverthemselvesintheeternalquestfor
higher yields in emerging markets and other higher‐risk investments.
From an emerging market perspective, the external scenario of the past
few years can be best characterized as “benign.” Yet, as of 2007, 85% of
countries in our core sample have recorded increases in real government
expenditures. Perhaps once again authorities view the favorable global
environmentaspermanent.Fullytwo‐thirdsofthe181countriescovered
in the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook recorded higher inflation in
2 0 0 7t h a ni n2 0 0 6 ,a n da ne q u a ls h a r er e c o r d e de v e nh i g h e ri n f l a t i o n
on a year‐end basis in 2007 than on a year‐average basis—pointing to
even higher readings for 2008. If this is what is to be expected in good
times, where capital bonanzas are plentiful, it is perhaps time to start
rereading Kindleberger.
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Note: Income classification from the World Bank. Number of countries in each category is
shown in parentheses.
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GDP, IMF World Economic Outlook: Billions
Nominal GDP
Real GDP
External accounts, IMF World Economic Outlook: Billions of U.S. dollars





Imports of goods and services
Exports of goods and services
Prices:
Consumer price index, IMF World Economic Outlook Indices
Inflation Percent
Equity prices, IMF International Financial Statistics Indices
House prices, Bank for International Settlements Indices
Exchange rate, International Financial Statistics National currency per U.S. dollar
Fiscal and national accounts, IMF World Economic





Crises indicators, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) Indices
Commodity prices, Boughton (1991)
and IMF World Economic Outlook Index
Short‐term interest rates, OECD and IMF
International Financial Statistics Percent
53Table A4
Dates of Capital Flow Bonanzas and External Debt Crises: Extended Sample, 1980–2007




Australia 1986, 1989, 2004–5, 2007






Germany 1980, 1991, 1994–95, 1999–2000
Greece 1983, 1985, 2000, 2006–7
Iceland 1982, 2000, 2004–7
Ireland 1980–84, 2007
Italy 1980–82, 1991–92
Korea 1980–83, 1991, 1996 1998
a
New Zealand 1982, 1984–85, 2005–7
Norway 1986–89, 1998
Portugal 1981–82, 2000–2001, 2005
Spain 2000, 2004–7
Sweden 1980–82, 1990–92
United Kingdom 1988–90, 2005–7
United States 2002–7
High income, non‐OECD:
Antigua and Barbuda 1981–82, 1986–89 1996–2006
Bahamas 1997–98, 2005–7
Bahrain 1987, 1989, 1991–93, 1998
Barbados 1981, 2004–7
Cyprus 1980, 1983–84, 1991–92
Czech Republic 1996–97, 2001–4
Estonia 2004, 2006–7
Georgia 1994–95, 2007
Hong Kong, SAR 1980–81, 1994–97
Israel 1981–84, 1995–96
Kuwait 1993, 1995–96, 1998
Malta 1995–96, 2000
Qatar 1992, 2004–7
Saudi Arabia 1983–84, 1986, 1991–93
Singapore 1980–84, 1987
Slovenia 1999, 2006–7
Trinidad and Tobago 1982–84, 1986, 1997–98 1988–89
Middle‐high income:
Argentina 1982, 1987, 1994, 1997–99 1982–93, 2004–5
Belize 2000–2005
Botswana 1980–84, 1990
Brazil 1980–83, 1999, 2001 1983–84
Bulgaria 1990–93, 2005–7 1990–94
Chile 1980–82, 1984–86 1983–90




Country Years of Bonanzas
Years of External
Default
Croatia 1997, 2002, 2007 1992–96
Dominica 1980–81, 1989–90, 2005 2003–5
Equatorial Guinea 1980–82, 1995–96, 1998





Lebanon 1983, 1990–92, 1997–98
Malaysia 1981–83, 1991, 1994–95
Mauritius 1980–82, 2006–7
Mexico 198‐–81, 1991–94 1982–90, 1995
a
Oman 1986, 1992–95, 1998
Panama 1980–82, 1997–98, 2007 1983–96
Poland 1980–81, 1985–89 1981–94
Romania 1992, 2004–7 1981–83, 1986
Russia 1992, 1997
Serbia 2007 1992–2004
Seychelles 1982, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2007 2000–2002
Slovak Republic 1996–98
South Africa 1981–82, 2005–7 1985–87, 1989, 1993
St. Kitts and Nevis 1989, 2003–3, 2007




Turkey 1980, 2000, 2004–7 1982
Uruguay 1980–84, 2001
Venezuela 1982, 1987–88, 1992–93, 1998 1983–88, 1990,
1995–97, 2004–5
Middle‐low income:
Albania 1991–92, 1997, 2002, 2007 1991–95
Algeria 1969, 1973, 1975–79, 1986,
1988–89, 1994–95, 1998
1991–96
Angola 1982, 1995, 1997–99, 2001 1985–2003
Armenia 1992, 1996–98
Azerbaijan 1996, 1998, 2003–4
Bhutan 1982–87
Bolivia 1981, 1985–87, 1993, 1998 1980–84, 1986–97
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003, 2005 1992–97
Cameroon 1980–81, 1987–88, 1993, 2002 1987–2003
Cape Verde 1980–81, 1999, 2003–4 1981–96
China 1985–86, 1988–89, 1993
Colombia 1982–83, 1995, 1997–98
Congo, Republic of 1994–96, 1998–99, 2007 1983–2007
Djibouti 2000, 2006–7




Country Years of Bonanzas
Years of External
Default




El Salvador 1989, 1990, 2003, 2005, 2007
Fiji 1981, 2004–7
Guatemala 1981, 1987, 1992–93, 1994,
1999, 2001
1986, 1989
Guyana 1980–83, 1985–86 1982–86
Honduras 1980–81, 1984, 2003–4, 2007 1981–2007
Indonesia 1982–83, 1986–87, 1991, 1995 1998–2001, 2002
Iran, Islamic Republic of 1980–81, 1986, 1991–93 1980–95
Jamaica 1981–82, 1985, 2007 1981–85, 1987–93
Jordan 1990–92, 2005, 2007 1989–93
Kiribati 1992, 1996, 2005–7
Lesotho 1991–93, 1996–98
Macedonia 1994, 1997–98, 2002 1983–99
Maldives 1980, 1993, 2005–7
Moldova 1993, 1997–98, 2006 1998, 2002
Morocco 1981, 1983–87 1983, 1986–90
Nicaragua 1988, 1990–94
Paraguay 1980–82, 1986–87, 1996 1986–92, 2003–4
Peru 1981–83, 1993, 1995, 1998 1980, 1983–97
Philippines 1980, 1982–83, 1990,
1993, 1997
1983–92
Samoa 1980–81, 1991–93, 2003
Sri Lanka 1979–84, 1986, 1988 1981–83
Suriname 1983, 1991, 1998–99,
2001, 2003
Swaziland 1980–85
Syrian Arab Republic 1980, 1983, 1994, 2006–7
Thailand 1981–83, 1990–91, 1995–96
Tonga 1990–91, 1994–95, 1998
Tunisia 1981–84, 1986, 1993 1980–82
Turkmenistan 1995, 1997–99
Ukraine 1994–95, 2007 1998–2000
Vanuatu 2002–3, 2005–7
Low income:
Benin 1981–83, 1988, 2002–3
Burkina Faso 1999–2001, 2004–5 1987–96
Burundi 1982–83, 1987, 1990, 2006–7
Cambodia 1988–89, 1996, 1998
Central African Republic 1980, 1982–84, 1992–95 1981, 1983–2007
Chad 1986, 2000–2004
Comoros 1984–85, 1987, 1994, 1997
Congo, Democratic
Republic of
1987, 1989, 1991–92, 2005 1980–2007




Country Years of Bonanzas
Years of External
Default
Ethiopia 1999, 2002, 2005–7 1991–99
Gambia 1980–81, 1996, 2005 1986–90
Ghana 1993, 1997, 1999, 2006–7 1968, 1970, 1974, 1987
Guinea 1988–90, 1996, 2007 1985–88, 1991–98
Haiti 1980–81, 1990–93 1982–99
India 1984, 1987–90




Madagascar 1980–81, 1990, 2005, 2007 1981–2002
Malawi 1980, 1992, 1994, 1997,
2002, 2005
1982, 1988
Mali 1980, 1996, 1999–2001, 2004
Mauritania 1980–83, 2004–5 1992–96
Mongolia 1998, 2002–3
Mozambique 1987–89, 1993–95 1983–92
Myanmar 1981–82, 1990–92, 1998 2002–7
Nepal 1982–84, 1989–91
Niger 1980–82, 2005–6
Nigeria 1981–83, 1986, 1993, 2002 1987–94, 2004–5
Pakistan 1993, 1996–97, 2007 1981, 1998–99
Papua New Guinea 1980–84, 1997
Rwanda 1991–93, 1997–98
São Tomé and Príncipe 1982, 1991–92, 2007 1987–94
Senegal 1980–84 1981–85, 1990, 1992–96
Sierra Leone 1980–82, 1990–91, 1996 1983–84, 1986–96
Solomon Islands 1985, 1991, 2005–7
Sudan 1981–82, 1992–95 1980–2007
Tanzania 1994–95, 1998–99 1980, 1982–84, 1988,
1991–97
Togo 1980, 1982–83, 1987 1980–93
Uganda 1991, 1993, 1998–2001 1981, 1985–93
Vietnam 1993–96, 2007 1985–98
Zambia 1981–82, 1998, 2000–2001 1983–94
Zimbabwe 1981–82, 1992, 2004–5 2000–2007
Note: The dates shown are those picked up by the algorithm described in the preceding
section. Consecutive years (e.g., Greece 2000, 2001) are treated as a single episode.
aA near default episode.
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International Economic Association in Istanbul, Turkey. The authors wish to thank Jeff
Frankel,FranciscoGiavazzi,AlejandroIzquierdo,FrankWarnock,andotherparticipants
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1. Gourinchas, Landerretche, and Valdes (2001) perform a similar exercise to assess
which credit booms end in crises and credit crunches and which do not. Edwards
(2004) is particularly careful in trying to consider both abrupt reversals and more gradual
adjustment.
2. We would also like to thank Gian Maria Milesi‐Ferretti for pointing out that the finan-
cial account figures have to be interpreted with care during years in which there is debt
forgiveness, which show up as large debt repayments (i.e., capital outflows).
3. We also impose a nonnegativity constraint, so countries that are capital exporters
throughout the sample never record a bonanza.
4. The interested reader is referred to app. fig. A1, which provides a comparison among
three definitions of bonanza episodes: using the current account, the financial account,
and capital flows.
5. The income group classification is that provided by the World Bank.
6. For example, Sarno and Taylor (1999), using standard time‐series techniques, decom-
pose the various components of international capital flows into their permanent and tran-
sitory components.
7. Lucas (1990) suggested that human capital differentials might account for this “paradox,”
whereas Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Alfaro, Kalemli‐Ozcan, and Volosovych (2008) point
to the high incidence of sovereign default and weak institutions, respectively.
8. The link between capital flow bonanzas and debt crises will be the focus of Sec. IV.
Fig. A1. Comparing definitions of capital flow bonanzas, 66 countries, 1960–2007.
Sources: Authors’ calculations and sources listed in app. table A3.
Reinhart and Reinhart 589. Discussions of the earlier wave of capital to central and eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union include Claessens, Oks, and Polastri (1998) and Lankes and Stern (1998); the more
recent experience is covered in Lane and Milesi‐Ferretti (2007).
10. It is important to note that the middle‐income group comprises middle‐low and
middle‐high income (the latter constitutes the largest single group), so our analysis bears on
many developing countries beyond the largest emerging markets.
11. See Fernandez‐Arias and Montiel (1996) for a survey of a literature that flourished
in the early 1990s.
12. As is conventionally done, the nominal commodity price index is deflated by an
index of the price of manufactures (see, e.g., Boughton 1991).
13. The missing two are Japan and the Netherlands, which are creditor countries.
14. There are, however, many instances in which the now‐advanced economies de-
faulted in their earlier incarnations; see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) for a full chronology
of these episodes.
15. It is important to reiterate that the incidence of sovereign default during the period
in question owes to emerging markets.
16. On the basis of the historical track record, it is plausible to expect a higherchance of a
sovereigndefaultafterabonanzaevenincasesinwhichgovernmentdebtisnotincreasing.
The reason is that the government sooner or later has usually ended up guaranteeing
private‐sector debts.
17. See Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) and the references cited therein for a discussion of
the stylized facts.
18. See Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) for evidence of fear of floating or, in the recent
context, fear of an appreciation.
1 9 .T ob ec l e a r ,t h ea m p l i t u d eo ft h es w i n gi sc a l c u l a t e da st h ep e r c e n t a g eg r o w t hi n
real government spending during an expansi o nm in usth egr ow thing o ve r n m e ntspe nd -
ing in downturns. In the case of an extremely procyclical government, real spending
would grow during good times (as shown in fig. 15), perhaps by 15%, and in downturns
it would contract by about 10%. Thus the amplitude of the swing during the business
cycle would be 25%.
20. It is important to recall that there is a positive association between the degree
of fiscal procyclicality and the incremental odds of a financial crisis around capital flow
bonanzas.
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